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Abstract. Th is article focuses on the views held by the early Bulgarian representative 
and interpreter of pragmatism Ivan Sarailiev (1887–1969) on the two trends of 
this doctrine – the method for ascertaining meaning proposed by Charles Sanders 
Peirce, and the theory of truth propounded by William James. Sarailiev applied and 
propagated the pragmatist ideas of the doctrine’s founders in Bulgaria in the 1920s, 
and is thus one of the fi rst followers of Peirce in Europe and the very fi rst in Eastern 
Europe. How deep was Sarailiev’s understanding of the two types of pragmatism? 
How did they shape his philosophy and what was their role? Th is article will try to 
address these questions as well as presenting the overall reception of pragmatism in 
Bulgaria in the Interwar period through Sarailiev who was its only serious proponent 
both at the time and long aft erwards.
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One of the general features of pragmatism is the opposition method for ascertaining 
meaning vs. theory of truth, or Peirce vs. James, which is an indispensable part of every 
survey of this doctrine, and is sometimes even chosen as a title (see Mounce 1997). 
Th is split of pragmatism was further intensifi ed by the work of the followers of the 
doctrine who – joining one of these two traditions, and continuing their studies in 
the direction preliminarily set by it – actually pushed the two trends further apart.
Th e division of pragmatism is refl ected in an unusual manner in the philosophy 
of the early Bulgarian follower and interpreter of the doctrine, Ivan Sarailiev, as both 
trends have their own place and play a specifi c role in his philosophy. Th is article will 
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try to prove the proposition that while it was mostly the pragmatism of James that 
Sarailiev presented to the general public, his own philosophical views were closer to 
the ideas of Peirce. Let us start by saying a few words about this remarkable yet still 
almost unknown Bulgarian scholar.
The revived thought
A few years ago the name and work of the Bulgarian philosopher Ivan Sarailiev was 
resuscitated. Sarailiev’s name had been condemned to a half-century of silence by 
the communist regime. Th en suddenly this brilliant thinker reappeared as though 
out of the blue. Professor Ivan Mladenov, who rediscovered Ivan Sarailiev, wrote 
of him: “Had he writt en in an internationally recognized language, Professor Ivan 
Sarailiev would have largely been celebrated as a prodigious and eminent thinker 
[…]” (Mladenov 2002: 282).
Ivan Sarailiev was born in Sofi a in 1887. In 1909 he graduated from Paris 
Sorbonne University summa cum laude in philosophy. One of his mentors at the 
Sorbonne was the famous scholar Henri Bergson. Aft er his graduation Sarailiev 
spent a year in Oxford and London perfecting his English and continuing his 
education. Th ere he met some well-known philosophers, among them Ferdinand 
Canning Scott  Schiller, one of the prominent pragmatists in Europe. Sarailiev was 
in intensive correspondence with both Bergson and Schiller. Th ese lett ers are now 
part of Ivan Sarailiev’s archive which contains also his diaries and a large number of 
documents that serve as important evidence for the scholar’s life and work.
Between 1916 and 1918 Sarailiev served as a press att aché fi rst in Germany 
and then in Switzerland where he continued his philosophical training, att ending 
the University of Berlin and the University of Bern. He was one of the very few 
Bulgarian scholars familiar with the three main philosophical traditions: the French, 
the Anglo-Saxon and the German. While the majority of Bulgarian philosophers 
aft er World War I followed the German Classical tradition, Ivan Sarailiev favored 
the Anglo-Saxon one. He spent the year 1924 in Great Britain, followed by two 
years (1931–1932) in the USA as a Rockefeller grantee. He studied pragmatism 
extensively and purposefully collected materials for his own future study entitled 
Pragmatism. Names that are worth noting among the many renowned professors 
Sarailiev met during his visits to various American universities, are John Dewey and 
William Pepperel Montague – two of the very few students of Peirce.
Although Sarailiev wrote almost exclusively in Bulgarian, he was fl uent in Greek, 
Latin, French, English, German and Russian. For thirty years (1920–1950), Sarailiev 
taught history of philosophy at Sofi a University. Th e long list of his courses included 
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pragmatism and contemporary American thought from the very beginning. In 1935 
he founded and presided over the Philosophy Club in Sofi a, which was created in 
semblance to the Metaphysical Club, based in Cambridge, Massachusett s, that gave 
birth to the name and doctrine of pragmatism in the early 1870s. Ivan Sarailiev’s 
prestige was recognized outside the borders of Bulgaria, too. He maintained contacts 
with his contemporary fellow philosophers, and took part in all major international 
conferences and congresses.
Sarailiev’s work includes a number of articles and essays, as well as seven books, 
among them General Ideas (writt en in 1916 and published in 1919 because of 
World War I), On the Will (published in 1920, second expanded edition in 1924), 
Contemporary Science and Religion (1931), Pragmatism (1938a, reprinted in 2002) 
and Socrates (1947). He also translated Principles of Human Knowledge by George 
Berkeley into Bulgarian. Th is book was published in 1914. Th rough his lectures and 
publications Sarailiev introduced the ideas of Bergson and pragmatism in Bulgaria.
His book Pragmatism (1938a) deserves special att ention. Th is is a remarkable 
book in many respects. It is the fi rst presentation of the pragmatic doctrine in 
Eastern Europe. Th e book that consists of essays on the greatest pragmatists, such 
as Charles S. Peirce, William James, Ferdinand C. S. Schiller and John Dewey, is 
well writt en and readable. Th e introduction presents the reception of the doctrine in 
England, France, Germany and Italy, and the appendix off ers a survey of the history 
of the terms “pragmatism”, “pragmatical”, and “pragmaticism” and is followed by 
twenty pages of annotated bibliography. We will return to this book later when 
examining the question of the role the two pragmatisms played in the philosophy 
of Ivan Sarailiev.
When the communist regime took power in 1944, Sarailiev’s career came 
to a violent halt. Th e new authority saw him as a bourgeois philosopher and a 
representative of the Western capitalist doctrines of Bergsonism and pragmatism. 
In June 1946 he was elected president of Sofi a University, but because of his refusal 
to cooperate with the communist authorities, he was compelled to resign some 
months later. Th e new governing body of Sofi a University off ered him the following 
deal: if he should accept the views held by the Communist Party and start teaching 
Marxism-Leninism, he would not be fi red in the impending political purge of the 
professors (CSA, 192). However, being committ ed to the advantages of pragmatism, 
the philosopher steadfastly declined this off er and remained true to his views. In 
1950, aft er a new series of att empts to break his will and “affi  liate” him with the ideas 
of Marxism-Leninism, the totalitarian power set its repressive machine in motion 
with the aim of removing him. Sarailiev was forced to retire and was banned from 
further publishing. Any access to his previous publications was prohibited and his 
name was classifi ed. He was saved from the labour camps only as a result of the 
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respect his work commanded even among the communists (see Bankov 1945: 
126). Th e authorities forbade his students from visiting him, but he was awarded 
a consolation prize: every morning he found a bunch of fresh fl owers left  by his 
students at the doorstep of his house (Apostolova 2004: 23). Ivan Sarailiev died 
peacefully, but in total obscurity and isolation, in Sofi a in 1969.
The pragmatism of William James 
in the works of Ivan Sarailiev
Sarailiev devoted most of his lectures on pragmatism and contemporary American 
thought at Sofi a University to William James. Th e talk he gave at the Philosophy 
Club on January 31, 1936 was entitled “Pragmatism and truth”. As the title clearly 
demonstrates, it was devoted to the pragmatist theory of James. What is more, in 
1921 Sarailiev invited one of James’ most energetic followers, the above-mentioned 
British pragmatist Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, to give a series of lectures on pragmatism 
in Sofi a. Although the visit did not in fact take place, the invitation itself is signifi cant. 
It is an indication that Sarailiev wanted to present to the Bulgarian scholarly 
community, above all, the pragmatism of James.
Th is trend is illustrated also by Sarailiev’s publications devoted to the newly formed 
doctrine. It is true that his book Pragmatism starts with the essay “Charles Peirce and 
his principle”. However, it is followed by a logical transition: “Pragmatism is not simply 
a method for clarifying ideas, it is a theory of truth. Pragmatism is gaining recognition 
and will be recognized above all as a new and daring understanding of truth.” (Sarailiev 
2002: 73)1 – thus the author crosses over to the fi eld of William James, and stays there 
until the very end of the book. Sarailiev interprets the theory-of-truth aspect of the 
doctrine not as an isolated phenomenon, but in the context of James’ other studies 
and above all his psychology. Th e book also contains a detailed analysis of the link 
between pragmatism and Th e Will to Believe, a book that is justly described as “the fi rst 
precursor of James’ theory of truth” (Sarailiev 2002: 84). Sarailiev defi nes Schiller’s 
humanism and Dewey’s instrumentalism as developments and corrections of certain 
aspects of the theory of James. Statements stressing the importance of pragmatism 
as a theory of truth are also found in the introduction and conclusion of Pragmatism 
(Sarailiev 2002: 20, 206).
1 We will be using and quoting the second edition of Pragmatism (Sarailiev 2002) since it 
contains a number of original corrections added by Ivan Sarailiev himself to his own copy of the 
book. Translations from Bulgarian are by me – A. T. 
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Having acquainted the readers with the views of James, Schiller and Dewey, 
Sarailiev (2002: 206–207) sums up the pragmatist theory in six brief tenets: true 
ideas are useful; they are verifi able; they are satisfying; truth is changeable; it is 
the work of man; it is made up of the consequences the idea leads to. Th is is how 
pragmatism was presented in Bulgaria in the Interwar period, and in this very form 
it found a group of zealous critics, namely the followers of German philosophy (see, 
e.g., Torbov 1929, Mihalchev 1939).2 Sarailiev himself knew that the most vehement 
criticism of pragmatism would come from the followers of German thought since 
he was aware of the incompatibility of the two traditions: “Th e inclination of the 
German philosophical mind to monism and absolutism does not predispose it to 
the perception of a doctrine [such as pragmatism] so impregnated with pluralism 
and radical empiricism” (Sarailiev 2002: 17).
Bearing in mind the development of humanist thought in the fi rst half of the 
twentieth century, Sarailiev’s decision to focus on the pragmatic theory of truth is 
far from surprising. When William James presented his pragmatism, he was already 
a world-famous scholar and a professor who presented and developed his views in 
front of thousands of students. Th is helped his doctrine win wide acclaim and many 
followers around the whole world. Th e career of Peirce, by contrast, was quite the 
opposite. Few were familiar with his ideas and his lack of experience with students 
was one factor in rendering his style cryptic and oft en incomprehensible. In a lett er 
to James dated March 20, 1910 Peirce (quoted in Fisch 1986: 36) wrote: “Th ere is 
one way, were it open to me, my logic might fi nd its way to people’s brains. Namely, 
if I could fi nd a class of young men […]”. However, this never happened in the last 
30 years of his life. Max Fisch (1986: 297) quotes a very keen observation made 
by Paul Carus at the Th ird International Philosophical Congress at Heidelberg  in 
1908: “Peirce is the only one pragmatist who can think scientifi cally and with logical 
precision. Th e others write like novelists rather than philosophers”. Arguably, this 
is why the texts of the latt er were more accessible and gained popularity. In brief, 
James’ ideas were widely propagated around the world, whereas Peirce’s remained 
largely unknown. Th erefore wishing to present the most popular and up-to-date 
philosophical doctrine of the English-speaking world, Sarailiev made the logical 
choice of presenting the pragmatism of James. Th is, however, is no proof that 
he himself embraced it. In the conclusion of Pragmatism, Sarailiev (2002: 246) 
critically examines each of the six tenets and demonstrates, providing an extensive 
list of examples, that “the pragmatic theory of truth is true but within certain limits. 
It does not have universal validity”. Sarailiev even implies that he might write a 
separate work advancing his own theory of truth which would do away with the 
2 Tseko Torbov is the Bulgarian translator of Kant, while Dimitar Mihalchev is an ardent 
follower of the philosophy of Johannes Rehmke.
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imperfections of the existing ones. Such a work, however, was never published, and 
is not among manuscripts preserved in the philosopher’s archives.
The pragmatism of Peirce in the works of Ivan Sarailiev
Sarailiev’s presentation of Peirce is more modest in volume in comparison with that 
of James. However, it is far more interesting and signifi cant.
It should be noted that Peirce’s ideas, as opposed to pragmatism in general, were 
not widely known until the early 1970s. Aft er his death in 1914, there were a few 
occasional att empts to popularise his work, such as the appendix of Th e Meaning of 
Meaning (Ogden and Richards 1923), the collection of Peirce’s philosophical essays 
Chance, Love, and Logic (Cohen 1923), and the fi rst six volumes of the Collected 
Papers of Charles Peirce (1931–1958). Th ese books, however, did not garner a 
great deal of interest even in academic circles and did not prompt any signifi cant 
secondary studies. In the early 1940s, in his lectures at the University of Chicago, 
Charles Morris promulgated Peirce’s ideas, which was then largely followed by 
silence. Despite the fact that several monographs on Peirce appeared (Gallie 1952; 
Th ompson 1953), in a 1959 Scientifi c American review, Ernest Nagel still referred to 
Peirce as a “litt le known American philosopher” (Nagel 1959).
It is all the more remarkable, then, that Sarailiev introduced his students to the 
life and views of the founder of pragmatism in the very beginning of the 1920s. 
Peirce’s fundamental essays were included in the list of recommended readings 
accompanying the course of lectures on pragmatism and contemporary American 
philosophy (CSA, 326). Later, in Sarailiev’s book Pragmatism we can fi nd an essay 
entitled “Charles Peirce and his principle” in which Sarailiev quotes Th e Collected 
Papers of Charles Peirce – a fact quite astonishing, bearing in mind that Sarailiev’s book 
was published in 1938 (and the manuscript was already fi nished in 1937). Th e fi rst 
six volumes of Collected Papers had just appeared from 1931 to 1935, and Sarailiev 
was already familiar with them in 1937. Th is edition of the Collected Papers (volumes 
7 and 8 were published in 1958) still is the standard reference work today (although 
it may be replaced on completion of the chronological edition begun by the Peirce 
Edition Project in 1982). Moreover, an essay by Saraliev on Peirce was published 
even earlier in the Bulgarian journal School Review (1933). At that time, when the 
name and work of Charles Peirce had been almost forgott en, Sarailiev appreciated 
the genius of his insights – the Bulgarian philosopher was then eff ectively ahead of 
today’s massive interest in the founder of pragmatism and semiotics by more than 
three decades. Th is makes him one of the fi rst scholars in Europe, and perhaps even 
in the world, who comprehended Peirce’s oeuvre.
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Sarailiev justifi ably underscores Peirce’s role as a founder of pragmatism – 
author of the term as well as the principle of pragmatism (Sarailiev 2002: 23). In 
presenting the method, he refers mainly to Peirce’s 1878 essay “How to make our 
ideas clear”, describing in detail the grades of clearness and the concept of thinking 
as a transition from doubt to belief. In this essay Peirce fi rst presented the logical 
principle which became known as the pragmatic maxim: “Consider what eff ects, that 
might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception 
to have. Th en, our conception of these eff ects is the whole of our conception of 
the object” (W 3: 266). Sarailiev specifi cally emphasizes this maxim (the only text 
in the essay marked in italics), stressing its importance in understanding Peirce’s 
ideas. He also gives special att ention to “Th e fi xation of belief ” as an essay that 
complements “How to make our ideas clear”. Sarailiev focuses on one more aspect: 
the intervention of James and its consequences, i.e. the splitt ing of pragmatism into 
two trends.
As already mentioned, James’ pragmatist theory of truth was severely criticized 
in the publications of Bulgarian scholars. Against the backdrop of this vocal reaction, 
the silence from the same quarter that accompanied the presentation of Peirce’s 
method is rather unusual. Th e reasons might be related to the fact that Sarailiev 
focused mainly on James’ theory and thus all criticism was channeled in this 
direction. Or, perhaps the rest of the philosophers in Bulgaria at the time simply did 
not comprehend Peirce and were not ready to perceive his ideas even if presented in 
the most accessible manner and in their own language.
Peirce scholars today agree that his pragmatism is “a doctrine, connected with 
other doctrines in a system” (Fisch 1986: 269). Th is system includes also Peirce’s 
phaneroscopy (the doctrine of categories), fallibilism, evolutionary cosmology, 
abduction, conception of thinking, early cognitive theory and semiotics (or 
“semeiotic” – the term Peirce also used). Th ese doctrines form a network in which 
each idea is connected with the others.
Th e relation between pragmatism and semiotics is particularly important for the 
present study. In the original version of pragmatism (that of Peirce) the pragmatic 
maxim was a criterion for ascertaining meaning, and the sign, being part of the process 
of semeiosis, was a carrier of this meaning. Peirce himself em phasized, implicitly and 
sometimes even explicitly, the close relation between pragmatism and semiotics. One 
example here is his claim that all thought is in signs. Another illustration is the self-
observation Peirce shared in a draft  of a lett er addressed to Victoria Lady Welby: “It 
has never been in my power to study anything […] except as a study of semeiotic” 
(Peirce 1977: 85–86). Th e pragmatic principle att ains complete clarity only when 
analysed in the context of the theory of signs because “Peirce tries to describe the 
methods of pragmatism using the terms of the semiotic doctrine” (Mladenov 2004: 
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88). Or, meta phorically speaking, Peirce’s doctrine of signs is his pragmatism “vested” 
in semiotic terms.
Th is argument, however, is absent from Sarailiev’s comments on Peirce. Th e 
pragmatic method was reduced to the maxim, which is in fact only the kernel of 
pragmatism. Th e remaining parts of the system were not directly introduced to the 
scholarly life of Bulgaria. Yet a large portion of them formed part of Sarailiev’s own 
philosophical views. Without mentioning even once Peirce’s ideas in his books 
General Ideas (1919), On the Will (1924), Contemporary Science and Religion (1931) 
and his philosophical diary published posthumously Meditationes (2005), Sarailiev 
developed ideas rather similar to those of the founder of pragmatism. His works 
demonstrate affi  nities with Peirce’s fallibilism, critical common-sensism, abduction, 
his conception of truth and even his evolutionary cosmology. Let us now cite a few 
short examples from Ivan Sarailiev’s philosophy, as represented in these works, that 
illustrate this point.
Sarailiev (2005: 66–67) claims that our knowledge of reality and ourselves is 
always incomplete, partial and fallible:
Can we think that today’s understanding [of reality] is true? It is perfectly 
possible that in time a new theory shall be proposed and we shall start seeing 
today’s as erroneous. […] Th is is how scientifi c knowledge moves forward, 
constantly striving to understand reality, constantly replacing certain expla-
nations with new ones, scratching the surface of a reality, which in its hidden 
essence remains forever unknown.
Th e gnoseological system developed by Sarailiev leads to the conclusion that the 
search for absolute truth must persist and yet there is also a clear understanding that 
it can never be brought to an end. Th is conclusion coincides completely with the 
views of Peirce; the latt er was convinced that adequate knowledge is unatt ainable, so 
much so that he even relinquished the name “pragmatism” when James broadened 
his own method for ascertaining meaning into a theory of truth.
Incomplete and fallible knowledge is oft en not a hindrance in our everyday lives. 
It oft en turns out that a certain idea or theory might work well even if it is not true. 
What is more, on the basis of such ideas humans can “control” phenomena around 
them. Ivan Sarailiev’s favorite example is electricity: there was no adequate theory 
for the nature of electricity for a very long time; yet this did not prevent humankind 
from using and managing it.
Sarailiev maintained that there were two opposing forces or two principles that 
created the world and determined its development, namely determination (necessi-
ty) and indetermination (chance, freedom). Absolute necessity and absolute freedom 
do not exist in any phenomenon. Th ey are a “boundary, approached yet never 
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reached by reality” (Sarailiev 1924: 191). Even matt er, which is usually perceived as 
the realm of determination, is pierced by a streak of freedom. Undoubtedly, at the 
macrocosmic level, matt er is determined. However, the atoms and electrons of which 
it consists move freely. What makes this possible is the fact that “macrophysical 
regularities do not suggest microphysical regularity; and microphysical irregularity 
can have a macrophysical regularity with a probability that may come very close 
to certainty bearing in mind the large number of individuals participating in 
macrophysical phenomena” (Sarailiev 1938b: 12). From here on, Sarailiev’s logic 
follows Berkeley: it is obvious that atoms and electrons have no consciousness. 
Th erefore, there must be another enormous consciousness external to them that 
causes this free movement. We all live within the thought of this consciousness. Th is 
is the thought of “a Creator who is a spirit and whose relationship to the world he 
has created is the same as the relationship between the artist and his work of art” 
(Sarailiev 1931: 20). Th is is how Sarailiev reaches the idea of God. Or in the words 
of Peirce: “Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion 
is in body we ought to say that we are in thoughts and not that thoughts are in us” 
(W 2: 227, footnote 4). And, later: “Should every mind cease to think [an idea] for 
a while, for so long it ceases to exist. Its permanent existence is kept up by its being 
an idea in the mind of God” (W 2: 480).
When we put together all Sarailiev’s claims concerning the role of deter-
mination and chance in the universe, we end up with the diagram of his model of 
the world (Figure 1). Th e white section of the diagram above illustrates the role of 
chance, while the marked section indicates the role of determination. We can see the 
correlation between them in each phenomenon: thought, art, language, matt er, etc. 
Th ought comes closest to absolute freedom, followed by art, language, etc. Th e direc-
tion of development of the universe is from right to left , i.e. from absolute freedom/
chance to absolute necessity (the rightmost and left most sections of the diagram, 
respectively) because everything in the universe stems from the pure thought of the 
Creator. When Sarailiev discusses the lack of pure chance and pure determination, 
he refers to the middle section only. Human life occurs in this section. Th e other two 
stages make up the infi nite past and future, respectively.
Peirce defi nes the development of the universe in the same manner: “At any 
time, however, an element of pure chance survives and will remain until the world 
becomes an absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is 
at last crystallized in the infi nitely distant future” (W 8: 110). Simultaneously, the 
three stages of the Universe (see the diagram above) correspond largely to Peirce’s 
“tychism”, “synechism” and “agapism” (or “chance”, “continuity” and “habit”).
Sarailiev maintains that people think in general ideas which are the smallest, 
integral part of our thought. Th ey are nothing more than mere hypotheses we 
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use when approaching the world. “When I think”, Sarailiev writes, “I feel a kind 
of vacillation” between two terms (Sarailiev 1919: 59). Th e function of thought, 
according to him, is to surmount diffi  culties. Th erefore, one of the terms must be the 
initial stage, the problem, which we are faced with, and the fi nal one – the surmounted 
diffi  culty. Th e galvanization between them, i.e. the action of thought, stops, when 
the fi nal point is reached. Th e aim of thinking, then, is to lead us between these 
two points. Th e fi nal chord is an action, caused by thought, because for Sarailiev 
(1919: 75) “psychological and even cognitive processes are never cognitive only; 
we know in order to act; knowledge helps action”. Although we are not in a position 
to overcome matt er, we are always in a situation that provokes thinking. Th e action, 
marking the end of a thought, is a potential beginning of another thought. Th e 
















































inanimate nature, plants  animals human beings 
Figure 1. Th e model of the world according to the philosophy of Ivan Sarailiev.
Sarailiev’s view on thinking is identical with Peirce’s conception of thought in his 
essay How to make our ideas clear. Th e diff erence is merely termino logical. Peirce 
calls the starting point “doubt”, and the fi nal one – “belief ”: “[…] the action of 
thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is att ained”. 
“Doubt” and “belief ” mean respectively “the starting of any question, no matt er 
how small or how great, and the resolution of it” (W 3: 261).
Sarailiev’s proposition asserts that the most important part of the described 
process is the general idea/hypothesis that plays the role of a mediator between the 
two extremes. Th erefore the knowledge we att ain at the end of the thinking process 
is neither completely new, nor immediate, but is always determined by previous 
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knowledge. Peirce reached the same conclusion: “No cognition not determined by 
a previous cognition, then, can be known. It does not exist […]” (W 2: 210).
Th ese are but a few of Sarailiev’s ideas that prove very similar to the philo-
sophy of Peirce. Th e forced discontinuation of the career of this Bulgarian scholar 
pro bably prevented him from collecting these ideas into a unifi ed doctrine. Th ey 
remain dispersed in his books yet their presence is a fact that allows us to call 
Sarailiev not only a promoter, but rather a representative, of pragmatism following 
Peirce’s doctrine. Finding  such an early  promoter of Peirce is interesting; fi nding 
such an early fellow traveller of Peirce is really intriguing.
It is not only the historical value of Ivan Sarailiev’s ideas that should be con-
sidered. For example, his pragmatic ideas on creation and reception of works of 
art can be used as an interpretative method in contemporary literary criticism (see 
Tashev 2012), but this remains beyond the scope of the current article.
Conclusion with a transition to semiotics
From the above we can conclude that from Sarailiev’s perspective the pragmatism 
of James and his followers boiled down to the six tenets cited above, whereas the 
original version of the doctrine appeared in Peirce’s classic essay “How to make 
our ideas clear”. Th e Bulgarian philosopher repeatedly stated that the theory of 
truth was more important with regard to the history of human thought. However, 
his own philosophical views seem to state otherwise. He did not appear to accept 
the Jamesian theory and his thoughts lead him to conclusions that coincided with 
those made by Peirce. Th is opens a whole new fi eld for contemporary humani-
ties. Since Peirce’s semiotics is similar to his pragmatism, then being a pragmatist 
Ivan Sarailiev was also a semiotician. Th erefore he lay the beginnings of semiot-
ic thought in Bulgaria in the early 1920s – before Louis Hjelmslev, Juri Lotman, 
Roland Barthes and Umberto Eco, and opened a new chapter in the history of se-
miotics to be yet unfolded.
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Два прагматизма в философии Ивана Сарыилиева
В фокусе данной статьи находятся взгляды Ивана Сарыилиева (1887–1969) на два направле-
ния в прагматизме: метод определения значения, предложенный Чарльзом Сандерсом 
Пирсом, и теорию истины Уильяма Джеймса. Сарыилиев был ранним представителем и 
интерпретатором прагматизма в Болгарии, применявшим и пропагандировавшим идеи 
Пирса в 1920-е годы, будучи, таким образом, одним из первых последователей Пирса в 
Европе и первым – в Восточной Европе. Но насколько глубоко понимал Сарыилиев два типа 
прагматизма? Как они воздействовали на его философию? Автор статьи ищет ответы на эти 
вопросы и дает обзор рецепции прагматизма в Болгарии в период между двумя войнами, 
сосредотачиваясь на Сарыилиеве, который был единственным серьезным последователем 
прагматизма как тогда, так и в течение долгих лет позднее. 
Kaks pragmatismi Ivan Sarailievi fi losoofi as
Käesolev artikli fookuses on Ivan Sarailievi (1887–1969) vaated kahele suunale pragmatismi 
õpetuses – tähenduse kindlakstegemise meetodile, mille pakkus välja Charles Sanders Peirce, 
ning William Jamesi poolt esitatud tõeteooriale. Sarailiev oli pragmatismi varajane esindaja 
ning tõlgendaja Bulgaarias, kes rakendas selle õpetuse rajajate vaateid ning propageeris neid 
Bulgaarias 1920ndatel aastatel, olles seega üks Peirce’i esimesi järgijaid Euroopas ning kõige 
esimene Ida-Euroopas. Kui sügavalt mõistis Sarailiev kaht tüüpi pragmatismi? Kuidas kujundasid 
need tema fi losoofi at ja milline oli nende osa? Artiklis tehakse katse tegelda nende küsimustega 
ning esitada ka ülevaade pragmatismi tervikretseptsioonist Bulgaarias sõdadevahelisel perioodil, 
keskendudes Sarailievile, kes oli selle ainuke tõsine pooldaja nii toona kui ka kaua aega hiljem.
